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THE POTENTIAL FOR REDUCING INFLATIONARY PRESSURES BY REFORMING GOVERNMENT REGULATION
by Murray L. Weidenbaum, Director
Center for the Study of American Business
Washington University
Numerous government activities, often unwittingly, generate inflationary pressures or otherwise interfere with the attainment of important national goals unrelated
to the specific activities.

These unwanted side-effects occur in good measure because

government policymakers frequently tend to ignore the effects of government programs
on productivity, capital formation, innovation, employment, and inflation.
For example, government imposition of socially desirable requirements on business
through the regulatory process appears to be an inexpensive way of achieving national
objectives.
payer.
mental

It costs the government little and is no significant burden on the tax-

But, the public does not escape paying the cost.
Pt~otection

Every time that the Environ-

Agency imposes a more costly, albeit less polluting, method of

production, the cost to the consumer of the resultant product will tend to rise.
Similarly, each time that the Consumer Product Safety Commission sets a standard
which is more costly to attain, some product costs will tend to increase.
The monetary authorities could offset the inflationary effects of regulation by
attempting to maintain a lower rate of monetary growth.

In practice, however, public

policy makers tend to prefer the higher rate of inflation to the additional monetary
restraint and the resulting decreases in employment and output.

Also, to the extent

that real resources are devoted to low-payoff activities, economic welfare is reduced.1!

The loss of the potential increases in productivity from such diversion

eliminates a possibility of offsetting ordinary factor cost increases and thus
exacerbates the inflation problem.
It is not inevitable, of course, that every regulatory activity increase inflationary pressures.
Note:

In those instances where regulation generates social benefits

The author is indebted to Roland McKean and Lee Benham for numerous useful
insights and helpful suggestions.
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(such as a healthier and thus more productive work force) in excess of the social
costs imposed by the government action, inflationary pressures should be reduced.
The point being made here is that many forms of governmental intervention in the
private sector involve heavy costs

and that, with some care and concern, the regu-

latory process might be revised so as to achieve comparable benefits at lower costs.
Indeed, the central purpose of this paper is not to propose the general elimination
of regulatory programs but to indicate some of the more promising approaches to reducing their inflationary consequences.
Adverse Impacts of Government Regulation of Business
Regulation and Inflation
There are a variety of ways, direct and indirect, in which the operation of
governmental regulatory programs contributes to an exacerbation of the inflation problem.

In some cases, the impact is direct and visible to all.

A striking case in

point is the passenger automobile, where the federal government has mandated a wide
array of specified safety and environmental features to be incorporated by the manufacturer.

In the case of the so-called interlock system, the public outcry became

so intense that the Congress overruled the regulators, eliminating the requirement.
Other types of government regulation may be indirect but equally costly.

Several

research efforts examining building regulations have documented repeated instances of
increases in the price of housing due to building codes.

A study at Rutgers Univer-

sity tentatively concluded that overly stringent or outdated codes increase housing
costs by somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of total unit costs.~

Several scholars

have estimated the effects of land-use controls on the cost of residential housing.
Although the analyses vary in methodology and data, they generally conclude that
there is a weak to moderate, but uniformly positive, relationship between single
family housing costs and land use controls in developing areas.~
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In many other ways, government regulation increases the overhead cost of producing goods and services.
case in point.

The rapidly rising paperwork burden furnishes a striking

One large corporation, the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, is re-

quired to file approximately 1,000 reports annually to 35 federal agencies including
the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Energy Administration, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and the Small Business Administration.

Duplication inevitably occurs.

The

company must report its oil and gas reserves, with each report taking slightly different form, to the FEA, the FPC, the FTC, and the U.S. Geological Survey.

It re-

quires 636 miles of computer tape to store the data that the company must supply to
the Federal Energy Administration.

In total, Indiana Standard has 100 full-time

employees whose work is centered around meeting federal regulations, at an annual
cost of about $3 million. 4/
Employee fringe benefit costs are increasing as a result of new pension regulations.

Some portion of advertising costs results from the requirements imposed by

· affirmative action programs in the equal employment opportunity area.

More indirect-

ly, it is likely that productivity is affected by the variety of regulations that are
designed to improve the quality of the work environment.

To the extent that the regu-

lations reduce accidents and absenteeism they do indeed contribute positively to output and thus economic welfare.
But in practice the emphasis has shifted to essentially "bureaucratic" concerns.
More forms are now filled out.

More safety rules are posted.

place.

But, no significant reduction in industrial accident

More fines are levied.

rates has resulted.
American industry.

More inspections take

Table 1 contains the latest available data on accident rates 1n
It can be seen that the experience for 1973 (the first year of

operation of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration) was not any more
favorable than for 1972, the year prior to the advent of OSHA.
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Table 1
Recordable Occupational Injury and Illness Incidence Rates for Selected Comparable
Industry Divisions, Private Nonfarm Sector, United States, 1973 and 1972
Incidence rates per 100 full-time workers 1
Total recordable
cases
1973
1972

Industry

Private nonfarm sector 2

Lost workday
cases
1973
1972

Nonfatal cases without
lost workda~s
1973
1972

11.0

10.9

3.4

3.3

7.6

7.6

10.5

10.8

4.6

4.5

5.9

6.3

Wholesale and retail trade

8.6

8.4

2.7

2.8

5.9

5.6

Finance, insurance, and real estate
Services 4

2.4

2.5

.8

.8

1.6

1.7

6.3

6.1

2.0

2.0

4.3

4.1

Transportation and public utilities 3

1 The incidence rates represent the number of injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time
workers, and were calculated as:

(N/EH) x 200,000, where

N = number of injuries and illnesses
EH = total hours worked by all employees during calendar year
200,000 = base for 100 full-time equivalent workers (working 40 hours per week, 50
weeks per year)
2 Includes oil and gas extraction which is not a component of the industry divisions
listed. Other mining activities are not included.
- 3 Excludes railroads (SIC 401).
4 Includes agricultural services, forestry, and fisheries (SIC 07-09).

Source:

U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, Occupational Injuries and
Illnesses by Industry, 1973, 1975, p. 2.
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In the case of the job safety program, as in numerous other areas of government
involvement, the important original concern of the public and the Congress has been
converted to the practice of not violating the rules and regulations.

11

You won•t get

into trouble if you don•t violate the safety standards, .. is the response, even if as
many accidents occur as before.

The emphasis shifts to such trivia as raising and

answering these types of questions:

How big is a hole? When is a roof a floor?

How frequently must spittoons be cleaned? The results in terms of the safety objective are almost invariably disappointing.
virtually predictable:

Yet, the reaction to this situation is

redouble the existing effort -- more rules, more forms, more

inspections, and thus higher costs to the taxpayer and higher prices to the consumer.
Regulation and Innovation
A hidden cost of government regulation is a reduced rate of innovation.

The

longer that it takes for a new product to be approved by a government agency -- or
the more costly the approval process -- the less likely that the change will be made.
In any event, innovation will be delayed.
A recent case is the new asthma drug beclomethasome dipropionate (BD).

Although

this drug has been used successfully by millions of asthma patients in England, it
still has not received approval of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

BD is de-

scribed as a safe and effective replacement for the drugs which are now administered
- to chronic asthma patients, but without the adverse side effects of the drugs in use
in the United States.

Unlike BD, the steroids currently prescribed in this country,

such as prednisone, can stunt growth in children, worsen diabetes, increase weight
through water retention, and cause bone softening.

The delaying procedures of the
5
FDA are preventing Americans from switching to the safer product, BD. /
Professor Sam Peltzman of the University of Chicago estimates that the 1962
amendments to the Food and Drug Act are delaying the introduction of effective drugs
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by about four years, as well as leading to higher prices for drugs. 6/

As a result

in good measure of the more stringent regulation, the United States was the 30th
country to approve the anti-asthma drug metaproterenol, the 32nd country to approve
the anti-cancer drug adriamycin, the 51st country to approve the anti-tuberculosis
drug rifampin, the 64th country to approve the anti-allergenic drug cromolyn, and
the 106th country to approve the anti-bacterial drug co-trimoxazole.ZI
The regulators really seem to have the private sector scared.

In August 1975,

the National Cancer Institute reported that the solvent trichlorethylene, known as
TCE, may be a possible cause of cancer.
nated coffee.

TCE at the time had been used in decaffei-

It seems that the government used a rather generous dose of the chemi-

cal on the test animals.

It was the equivalent of a human being drinking 50 million

cups of decaffeinated coffee every day for an entire lifetime.

It would seem that

the consumer's bladder would give out or he or she would drown before having to worry
about getting cancer.

But what was the industry's reaction? To laugh at this example

of governmental nonsense? Hardly.

With the cyclamate episode still firmly in mind,
one major producer quickly changed to another chemica1. 8/
Examples of obvious inefficiencies or trivia in regulation of business are not
hard to come by. 91 .Capable, intelligent and well-meaning administrators delegating
decisions to capable, intelligent and well-meaning subordinates cannot specify in
advance all of the correct or desirable exceptions to general rules.

Upon examina-

tion, the reported examples of regulatory nonsense often do not turn out to be mere
- flukes.

They are almost an inevitable result of the rapid expansion of the scope and

variety of regulatory functions that has occurred in the United States in recent
years. 101
The adverse effect of regulation on innovation may be felt more strongly by
smaller firms and thus have an anti-competitive impact.

According to Dr. Mitchell
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Zavon, president of the American Association of PoisQn Control Centers:
"We•ve got to the point in regulatory action where it•s
become so cos~ly and risky to bring out products that'
only the very largest firms can afford to engage in these .
risky ventures. To bring out a new pesticide you have to
figure a cost of $7,000,000 and seven years of time ....!.!/
Regulation and Capital Formation
Federal regulation also affects the prospects for economic growth and productivity
by levying a claim for a rising share of new capital formation.

This is most evident

in the environmental and safety areas and its importance can be observed quite readily.
An examination of the flow of capital spending by American manufacturing companies just prior to the recent recession is quite revealing.

In 1969, the total

new investment in plant and equipment in the entire manufacturing sector of the
American economy came to $26 billion.

The annual totals rose in the following years.

But when the effect of inflation is eliminated, it can be seen that four years later,
in 1973, total capital spending by U.S. manufacturing companies was no higher.
11

In

real terms, .. it was approximately $26 billion in both years.
That is not the end of the story, however.

In 1973, a much larger proportion of

capital outlays was devoted to meeting government regulatory requirements in the
pollution and safety area-- $3 billion more, to be specific. 121 Hence, although
the economy and its needs had been growing substantially in those four years, the
real annual investment in modernization and new capital had actually been declining.
The situation was worsened by the accelerated rate at which existing manufacturing
facilities were being closed down because the rapidly rising costs of meeting government regulations meant that they were no longer economically viable.

About 350

foundries in the United States have been closed down during 1971-1974 because they
could not meet requirements such as those imposed by the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 131 This may help to
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explain why the American economy, for a substantial part of 1973, appeared to lack
needed productive capacity, despite what had been large nominal annual investments
in new plant and equipment in recent years.
The governmental dec·ision-making process can have other adverse effects on capital formation by introducing uncertainty about the future of regulations governing
the introduction of new processes and products.

An example is furnished in a

November 1975 report of a task force of the President•s Energy Resources Council
dealing with the possibility of developing a new synthetic fuel industry.

In

evaluating the impact of the. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
the task force reported,

lt would be next to impossible at this time to predict
the impact of these requirements on synthetic fuels production ... 14 /
11

With reference to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the task force
stated that the major uncertainty was not whether a project would be allowed
to proceed, but rather the length of time that it would be delayed pending the
issuance of an environmental impact statement that would stand up in court.
task force pointed out,

11

The

The cost of such delays (construction financing and inflated

raw materials and labor costs) is an obvious potential hazard to any synfuels project ... ~
In evaluating the overall impact of government regulatory activity, the task
In summary, some of these requirements could easily hold up or
permanently postpone any attempt to build and operate a synthetic fuels plant ... 161

force concluded,

11

Regulation and Employment
Government regulation, albeit unintentionally, can have strongly adverse effects
on employment.

This has been demonstrated in the minimum wage area where teenagers

have increasingly been priced out of labor markets.

One recent study has shown that
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the 1966 increase in the statutory minimum wage resulted by 1972 in teenage employment in the United States being 320,000 lower than it otherwise would have been.
As a result of that one increase in the compulsory minimum wage, the youth unemployment rate in 1972 was 3.8 percentage points higher than otherwise would have been
the case. 17 1
In the construction labor area -- where unemployment rates are substantially
above the national average -- government regulation also acts to price some segment
of the work force out of competitive labor markets.

Under the Davis-Bacon legisla-

tion, the Secretary of Labor promulgates "prevailing" wages to be paid on federal
and federally-supported construction projects.

A variety of studies has shown that

these federally-mandated wage rates are often above those that actually prevail in
the labor market where the work is to be done. 181
Perhaps although only to a minor degree, the equal employment opportunity program may tend to increase unemployment by delaying the filling of job vacancies.

To

the extent that employers must undergo protracted job searches prior to hiring employees, the average length of unemployment is likely to be longer.

It is not un-

common for a position to remain unfilled despite the presence of an adequate labor
supply at market prices because the governmental regulatory requirements have not
been met.
Regulation and Entrepreneurial Functions
One of the immeasurable impacts of government regulation relates to the basic
entrepreneurial nature of the private enterprise system.

To the extent that manage-

ment attention is diverted from traditional product development, production, and
marketing concerns to meeting governmentally-imposed social requirements a significant but subtle socialization of corporate activity may result.
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In theemployeepension area, for example, the recently-enacted pension regulation
has shifted much of the concern of the management of the pension funds from maximizing the return on the contributions to following a more cautious approach of minimizing the likelihood that the fund managers will be criticized for their investment
decisions.

It thus becomes

s~fer

-- although not necessarily more desirable to the

employees covered -- for the pension managers to keep more detailed records of their
deliberations, to hire more outside experts (so that the responsibility can be diluted), and to avoid innovative investments. 191
It may be difficult to appreciate the extent of the detail and minutia of the
government regulation which is imposed on private sector activities.

It is

instructive to examine the Federal Register, the official publication which contains
the rules and regulations promulgated by federal agencies.

The January 16, 1976

issue is dominated by the 94 pages of tables which contain the minimum wage rates
for federal and federally-assisted construction established by the Secretary of Labor
under the Davis-Bacon Act.
Of the remainder of the January 16 Register, a major item relates to the orange
juice standards of the Food and Drug Administration.

This section ranges from the

types of equipment which are deemed acceptable to measure the color of orange juice
to the number of points required (36 to 40) for canned orange juice to qualify as
being of "good color."

This fascinating portion of the Register is followed by

lemon regulation 22, which restricts the number of lemons which may be shipped from
California and Arizona during the period January 18-24.

Another FDA regulation then

describes the handling of dried prunes.
Several of the other items in the January 16 Register may be of somewhat greater
importance.

They deal with standards on school bus brakes, procedures for making

rural housing loans, advertising for eye glasses, subsidies for local railroad
service, and the amount of notice that must be given if a drawbridge is required to
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Not all of the items in the January 16 Register necessarily impress the

casual reader as being those matters of high national policy which the Founding
Fathers presumably had in mind in forming a more perfect union.
Approaches to Regulatory Reform
A new way of looking at the microeconomic effects of government programs is needed.

A parallel can be drawn to macroeconomic policymaking, where important and at

times conflicting objectives are recognized.

Attempts at reconciliation or trade-

off are made, such as among economic growth, employment, income distribution,and
price stability.
At the programmatic or microeconomic level, it is also necessary to reconcile
the goals of specific government programs with other important national objectives,
which are not now in practice the concern of many of those agencies.

Healthy working

conditions are an important national objective, but surely not the only one.

And

society has no stake in selecting the most costly and disruptive methods of achieving a higher degree of job safety.

A similar situation occurs in relating environ-

mental protection, product safety, and other regulatory efforts with such important
practical concerns as the cost to the consumer, the availability of new products, and
the efficiency of productive activity.
One method of broadening the horizons of government policymakers and administrators is through the device of the economic impact statement.

The requirement that

they consider the costs and other adverse effects of their actions as well as the
benefits should .be imposed on the economic regulatory commissions as well as on the
regulatory activities of the other departments and agencies.

Economic impact state-

ments also should be required of procurement and subsidy programs which contain regulatory features.
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This is not a plea for the elimination of government regulation, but rather for
reducing where possible the inflationary and other undesirable consequences.

The

theoretical rationale for this moderate approach was provided by Professor F. A.
Hayek in his Constitution of Liberty:
..... a free market system does not exclude on principle .. .
all regulations governing the techniques of production .. .
They will normally raise the cost of production, or what
amounts to the same thing, reduce overall productivity.
But if this effect on cost is fully taken into account
and it is still thought worthwhile to incur the cost to
achieve a given end, there is little more to be said
about it. The appropriateness of such measures must be
judged by comparing the overall costs with the gain; it
cannot be conclusively determined by appeal to a geDeral
principle."20/
In a more specific way, the same point was made by a leading liberal legislator.
Senator Hubert Humphrey has provided a very cogent example of the shortcomings of
the existing regulatory approach:
"The government goes around willy-nilly making decisions
of consequence. There was no estimate of the economic
impact of the Occupational Safety Act, for example. I
happen to be for the occupational safety program, but
what were its economic implications? Did anyone think
that through? No. "?11
The policy formation process needs to proceed beyond merely another set of socalled inflation impact statements.

First of all the costs and the benefits need to

be more than examined; they should be weighed one against the other.

In the process

the actual or proposed regulations that generate excessive costs should be modified
or eliminated.

But we need .to go beyond the direct impact on price, and include the

relationship to productivity, capital formation, and innovation.
Relating Costs to Benefits
In November 1974, President Gerald Ford did instruct the federal agencies under
his jurisdiction to examine the effects of the major regulatory actions that they
would be taking on costs, productivity, employment, and other economic factors

- 13 (Executive Order 11821).
ings in this effort.

Although a useful step forward, there are severe shortcom-

First of all, many of the key regulatory agencies-- ranging

from the Consumer Product Safety Commission to the Federal Trade Commission -- are
so-called .. independent agencies, .. which are beyond the President's purview.
Even in the case of the regulatory activities which come within the President's
jurisdiction, the new policy is limited to the regulations which, in the issuing
agency's own estimation, are "major ...

In any event, the agencies covered by the

Executive Order are only required to examine the economic aspects of their actions. 22 /
A broader approach seems to be warranted, in the fashion of the current environmental
impact statements.
The society is now supposed to examine the impact on the environment of the
various major actions that it takes.

Would it not also be appropriate to require

each federal, state, and local environmental agency to assess the impacts of its acI

tions on the society as a whole, and particularly on the economy?
environment is an important national objective.
jective.

Surely a cleaner

But it is not the only national ob-

Certainly the nation has no stake in selecting the most expensive or most

disruptive ways of achieving its environmental goals.
Much would depend on the "teeth" that would be put into the required economic
impact statement.

Merely legislating the performance of some economic analysis by

an unsympathetic regulator would primarily delay the regulatory process and make it
more

costly~.

But limiting government regulation to those instances where the total

benefits to society exceed the cost would be a major departure.

It could signifi-

cantly slow down if not reverse the current rising trend of federal regulation of
business.
To an economist, government regulation should be carried to the point where the
incremental benefits equal the incremental costs, and no further.

(Indeed, this is
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the basic criterion which is generally used to screen proposed government investments in physical resources.)

Overregulation-- which can be defined a situation

where the costs exceed the benefits -- should be avoided.

But if policymakers tend

to ignore or downplay the costs, we are bound to operate in the zone of overregulation, which is likely where we are today.
In making decisions on which regulations to adopt, the governmental decisionmaking body should pay particular attention to several "overhead" types of areas that
are often neglected -- the monitoring costs by the government itself, the information costs imposed on both the public and private sectors, and the related private
costs of compliance and/or avoidance.

It is hardly coincidental that, simultaneous

with the recent expansion of governmental regulatory activity, the cost of legal
departments and of legal services has been one of the most rapidly growing segments
of company budgets.
It is also important to build into the governmental processes those incentives
which would encourage government officials to give greater weight to the costs and
other side-effects generated by the actions that they take.

Limiting new regula-

tions to those instances where it can be demonstrated that net benefits accrue to
society as a whole is one such device.

At the operational level, attention might

be given to the use of the budget process as an added tool of management of regulation.

In those cases where the cost-benefit analyses produced by an agency did not

turn out to be an accurate representation of the effects of a regulation-- i.e.,
where an agency•s regulations in practice generate more costs than benefits -- its
budget for the coming year would be reduced, and vice versa.
The wide dissemination of the data on the economic impacts of government regulation might serve to alter the balance of interest group forces now exerted on the
decisionmaking process.

At the present time, it often appears that the interest

groups which would benefit from the regulation are well aware of those positive con-

- 15 . tributions and thus mobilize their forces in favor of greater regulation.

But the

information on the adverse consequences of regulation, if widely distributed, might
generate countervailing interest group pressures. 23 /
Reorganization of Regulation
The effort, however, needs to proceed beyond mere statistical analysis.

It

should also cover the question of reorganizing the wide variety of regulatory agencies that has been established.

During the past decade there has been a rapid ex-

pansion of federal regulatory agencies.

Newcomers to the federal bureaucracy include

the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Environmental Protection Administration,
the Federal Energy Administration, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
As shown in Table 2, the expenditures of the major federal regulatory agencies
came to almost $2.8 billion in the fiscal year 1976.

This is a 48 percent increase

over the costs of these regulatory activities in fiscal 1974.

It is apparent that

the biggest regulatory budgets are not those for the traditional industry-specific
regulatory commissions, such as the ICC ($50 million) or the CAB ($85 million).
Rather, the largest proportion of the funds is devoted to the broader, industry-wide
regulatory activities of the Department of Labor ($397 million, mainly for wage and
hour standards and job safety), Agriculture ($381 million, largely for food inspection), and the Federal Energy Administration ($208 million).
A consolidation of the numerous federal regulatory agencies may now be desirable.
Each of these regulatory agencies was created at a different time and usually to
further one specific objective -- a cleaner environment, healthier working conditions,
safer products, etc.

Legislative mandate in hand, each agency pursues its individual

tasks, as it sees them.

Yet increasingly achieving one agency's objective may

frustrate if not negate the performance of another.

The Environmental Protection

- 16 Table 2
Types of Federal Regulatory Activities
Fiscal year 1976. In millions of dollars.
Amount

Area and Agency
Consumer Safety and Health
Department of Agriculture
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Department of Justice
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Consumer Product Safety Commission
National Transportation Safety Board
Subtotal

$ 381
189

171
234
320
37
10

1,342

Job Safety and Other Working Conditions
Department of the Interior
Department of Labor
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
National Labor Relations Board
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Subtotal

79
397

60
70
6

612

Environment and Energy
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Energy Administration
Subtotal

54

208

262

Financial Reporting, etc.
Cost Accounting Standard Board
Council on Wage and Price Stability
Securities and Exchange Commission
Subtotal

2
2
49
53

- 17 Table 2 (continued)
Industry-Specific Regulation
Civil Aeronautics Board
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Power Commission
Federal Trade Commission
International Trade Commission
Interstate Commerce Commission
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Renegotiation Board
Subtotal
Grand Total

Source:

Budget of the U.S. Government for the Fiscal Year 1976.

85

11
50
8
36

· 45
10
50

198
5

498

2,767
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. Agency encourages the conversion of powerplants from coal to less polluting fuels
as natural. gas and then the Federal Energy Administration urges the shift back

su~h

to coal, which is the relatively more plentiful fuel.

Examples abound of overlapping

jurisdictions and cross-cutting objectives -- job safety versus elimination of discrimination, a quieter workplace versus a cleaner workplace, clean air versus clean
water, etc.
For example, the desulfurization of coal -- to reduce air pollution -- requires
a combination with lime.
calcium sulfate.
problems.

But doing that generates large quantities of solid waste

Disposing of calcium sulfate in turn creates water pollution

Another example relates to federal food standards which require meat-pack-

ing plants to be kept clean and sanitary.
usually tile or stainless steel.
of noise.

Surfaces that are easiest to clean are

But tile and stainless steel are highly reflective

They may not always meet the standards set for occupational safety and

health.
Perhaps an organizational structure can be developed which encourages better communication among the regulators and, especially, the reconciliation of conflicting
objectives within the governmental mechanism.

Such action might permit a greater

degree of .. internalizing" the benefits and costs that arise from the regulatory process.

Moreover, such attempt at reconciliation would be performed in the government

itself, and hopefully prior to the issuance of regulations.

That could help to re-

duce the situations where business firms and individuals are caught in the
crossfire of conflicting government regulations.
General Attitudes Toward Regulation
More basically, however, it is attitudes that need to be changed.
under the job safety program provides a striking point.

The experience

Although the government's

safety rules, regulations, and requirements have resulted in literally billions of
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dollars in public and private outlays, the basic goal of a safer work environment has

.not been

achieved.

A more satisfying answer requires a basic change in approach to regulation, and
one that is not limited to the job safety program.
merely as an illustration.

Indeed, that program is used here

If the objective of public policy is to reduce accidents,

it should focus directly on the reduction of accidents.

Excessively detailed regula-

tions often are merely a substitute for hard policy decisions.

Rather than issuing

citations to employers who fail to fill out the forms correctly or who do not post
the correct notices, the emphasis ought to be placed on those employers with high
and rising accident rates, perhaps levying fines on those with the worst safety records.

(Variable insurance rates may perform a similar function).

As the accident

rates decline toward some sensible average standard, the fines could be reduced or
eliminated.
But the government should not be concerned with how a specific company achieves
the objective of a safer working environment.

Some may find it more efficient to

change work rules, others to buy new equipment, and still others to retrain workers.
But that is precisely the kind of operational business decisionmaking that government
should avoid, but which now dominates so many of

thes~

regulatory programs.

Without

diminishing the responsibility of the employers, the sanctions under the federal
occupational safety and health law should be extended to employees, especially those
whose negligence endangers other employees.
~

The purpose here is not to be harsh, but

to set up effective incentives to achieve society's objectives.

This can be a pre-

ferred alternative to government specifying the details of what it considers to be
.. acceptable .. private action.
Any realistic appraisal must acknowledge that important and positive benefits
have resulted from many of the government's regulatory activities -- in terms of less
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pollution, fewer product hazards, ending job discrimination, and achieving other
"

socially desirable objectives of our society.
It should also be realized that these federal programs were established by the
Congress in response to a surge of rising public expectations about corporate performance.

Although business executives rarely talk or write in terms of the costs

and benefits of their actions to society as a whole, they often are aware of that
basic justification for governmental intervention.

The president of Chrysler

furnished a cogent example in justifying governmental automobile pollution controls:
..... a large part of the public will not voluntarily spend
extra money to install emission control systems which will
help clean the air. Any manufacturer who installs and
charges for such equipment while his competition doesn•t
soon finds he ts losing sales and customers. In cases
like this, a Government standard requiring everyone to have
such equipment is the only way to protect both the public
and the manufacturer ... 24/
But the .. externalities" generated by federal regulation need not justify government•s attempt to closely regulate every facet of private behavior.
Alternatives to Regulation
The promulgation by government of rules and regulations restricting or prescribing private activity is not the only means of accomplishing public objectives.

As

Roland McKean has pointed out, codes of behavior which are adhered to on a voluntary
basis may often be effective. 25 1 That approach may have special application at the
present time.

The recent revelations concerning misdeeds by corporate executives in

their dealings with various government officials are leading to pleas for tighter
regulation of such business behavior.

But given the almost universal public outrage

which has resulted, it is most likely that the prevailing norms of corporate behavior
are being changed substantially -- and voluntarily -- so as to avoid repeating the
episodes which have proven so damaging both to the individuals and to their organizations.
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I,..

Government itself has available to it numerous powers other than regulation.
Through its taxing authority the government can provide strong signals to the market.
i

!For example, rather than promulgating detailed regulations governing allowable dis1

lcharges into the nation's waterways, the government could levy substantial taxes on
,those discharges.

Such sumptuary taxation could be progressive
11

11
,

to the extent

that the tax rates rise faster than the amount of pollution emitted by an individual
polluter.

Thus, there would be an incentive to concentrate on removing or reducing

the more serious instances of pollution rather than dissipating environmental cleanup efforts as is often the case at the present time.
Using taxation is not meant to punish polluters, or even to give them a license
11

j

!to pollute.

Iproducers
1

Rather it would be an effort to utilize the price system by encouraging

and consumers to shift to less polluting and thus more economical ways of

·! producing and consuming goods and services.

The basic concept is simple: most

)

!

: people do not pollute because they get positive pleasure from dirtying the environ-

!

jment.

Rather they pollute because it often is easier or cheaper than not polluting.

I

; By changing basic incentives through the tax-price mechanism, individuals and

; organizations (both public and private) would be encouraged voluntarily to alter
!their economic behavior in a manner which is more conducive to the goals of the
society.

Perhaps most important would be the shift in public-private relationships

from the current adversary position to a more neutral and efficient mode of conduct.

11
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